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a b s t r a c t
In this paper, we deal with two-person zero-sum gameswith fuzzy payoffs and fuzzy goals.
We have presented two models for studying two-person zero-sum matrix games with
fuzzy payoffs and fuzzy goals. We assume that each player has a fuzzy goal for each of
the payoffs. We obtained that the fuzzy relation approach and the max–min solution are
equivalent.
© 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In this work, we consider two-person zero-sum gameswith fuzzy payoffs and fuzzy goals. A payoff matrix with elements
is represented as a fuzzy payoffmatrix. For anypair of the strategies, a player receives a payoff represented as a fuzzynumber,
i.e., the strategy itself is not fuzzy but the payoffs are fuzzy. For example, when a payoff matrix of a game is constructed with
information from a competitive system, elements of the payoff matrix would be ambiguous if any imprecision or vagueness
exists in the information. This paper relates to the research fields—Sakawa’s method for two-person zero-sum games and
Vijay’s generalized model [1,2]. Most of the studies on games are on two-person games [3–6] but recently several articles
have been devoted to the studies of n-personmultiobjective games [7,8]. The research on fuzzy games has been developed by
Aubin [9,10] and Butnariu [11,12]. Recently, Campos [13] has explored zero-sum fuzzy matrix game. The problem treated
by Campos was a game with a single payoff, and the min–max problem was formulated using the fuzzy mathematical
programming method. Moreover, Sakawa and Nishizaki [1,14] have explored zero-summultiobjective fuzzy matrix games.
One of the most celebrated results in matrix game theory suggests that every two-person zero-sum matrix game is
equivalent to a pair of linear programming problems that are dual to each other. Therefore, solving such a game amounts to
solving any one of these two mutually dual linear programming problems and obtaining the solution of the other by using
a linear programming duality theory.
In recent years, attempts have been made to extend the results of crisp game theory to the fuzzy games. For details
one can refer to [15]. The motivating force behind these extensions is the advancement in the duality theory for fuzzy
linear programming problems. The earliest contributions to fuzzy linear programming include the works of [16,17]. Later
Bector [18] used these duality results to study matrix games with fuzzy goals. Further Vijay [19] extended the duality result
to linear programs with fuzzy parameters and applied them to study matrix games with fuzzy payoffs.
Very recently, new approaches have emerged for studying duality in fuzzy linear programming such as [20–23].
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In this paper, solution concepts in two-person zero-sum games with fuzzy payoffs and fuzzy goals are proposed. In
Section 2, certain basic definitions and preliminaries regarding the crisp matrix games and some basic results related to the
fuzzy relations are presented. In Section 3, Sakawa’s method and Vijay’s method for computing the solution of a two-person
zero-sum games with fuzzy payoffs and fuzzy goals are defined. In addition, numerical examples illustrate the proposed
methods.
2. Preliminaries
Definition 1. Let Rn be the n-dimensional Euclidean space and Rn+ be its non-negative orthant. Let A ∈ Rm×n be m × n
an real matrix, et = (1, . . . , 1) be a vector of ones whose dimension is specified as per the specific context, and Sm ={
x ∈ Rm+, etx = 1
}
, Sn = {y ∈ Rn+, ety = 1}. By a crisp two-person zero-sum matrix game G we mean the triplet G =
(Sm, Sn, A)where Sm (respectively Sn) is called the strategy space for Player I (respectively Player II).
Definition 2. A triplet (x∗, y∗, v∗) ∈ Sm × Sn × R is called a solution of the game G if
x∗
t
Ay ≥ v∗, ∀ y ∈ Sn,
x
t
Ay∗ ≤ v∗, ∀ x ∈ Sm.
Here x∗ (respectively y∗) is called the optimal strategy for Player I (respectively Player II) and v∗ is called the value of the game
G. Given a two-person zero-sum game G, it is customary to associate the following pair of primal–dual linear programming
problems (LP) and (LD) with Player I and Player II, respectively.
(LP) max v
subject to
m∑
i=1
aijxi ≥ v j = 1, . . . , n
etx = 1
x ≥ 0
(LD) min w
subject to
n∑
j=1
aijyj ≤ w i = 1, . . . ,m
ety = 1
y ≥ 0.
Theorem 3. Every two-person zero-sum matrix game G has a solution [24].
Theorem 4. (x∗, y∗, v∗) ∈ Sm×Sn×R is a solution of the game G if and only if x∗ is an optimal solution to (LP), y∗ is an optimal
solution to (LD) and v∗ is the common optimal value of (LP) and (LD) [24].
An α-level set of a fuzzy set B˜ in X is defined as[
B˜
]
α
= {x ∈ X | µB˜(x) ≥ α}
and a strict α-level set of B˜ is given by(
B˜
)
α
= {x ∈ X | µB˜(x) > α} .
A binary relation between the elements of X and Y , denoted by P , is a subset of the cartesian product X × Y , i.e., P ⊂ X × Y .
Definition 5. A fuzzy subset P ⊂ F(X × Y ) is called a valued relation on X × Y , i.e., P : X × Y → [0, 1]. A valued relation P
on X is a valued relation on X × X i.e., P ⊂ F(X × X).
Definition 6. A valued relation P on F(X) × F(Y ) is called a fuzzy relation on X × Y , and it is denoted by P˜ , i.e., P˜ :
F(X)× F(Y )→ [0, 1].
Definition 7. Let P be a valued relation on X × Y . A fuzzy relation Q˜ on X × Y with µQ˜ (x, y) = µP(x, y),∀x ∈ X, y ∈ Y , is
called a fuzzy extension of the relation P .
Definition 8. Let P be a valued relation on X , and µcP be the membership function of the valued relation cP called the
complement of P given by
µcP(x, y) = 1− µP(x, y), ∀x, y ∈ X .
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Let Q˜ be a fuzzy extension of cP . Then a fuzzy relation Q˜ d on X defined by
µQ˜ d(A, B) = 1− µQ˜ (B˜, A˜), ∀A˜, B˜ ∈ F(X),
is called the dual fuzzy extension of the valued relation P .
Definition 9. Let P be a valued relation on X, T be a t-norm and S be its dual t-conorm. The T -fuzzy extension and the T -dual
fuzzy extension of P , denoted as fuzzy relations P˜T and P˜S , respectively, are defined as:
µP˜T (A˜, B˜) = sup
x,y∈X
{T (µP(x, y), T (µA˜(x)µB˜(y)))},
µP˜S (A˜, B˜) = infx,y∈X{S(S(1− µA˜(x), 1− µB˜(y)), µP(x, y))}
for all A˜, B˜ ∈ F(X) [21].
Definition 10. Let X ⊂ R and f : R → [0, 1]. Then f is called semistrictly quasiconcave function on X if it satisfies the
following conditions.
(i) f (λx+ (1− λ)y) ≥ min(f (x), f (y)), ∀x, y ∈ X,∀λ ∈ [0, 1]with λx+ (1− λ)y ∈ X,
(ii) f (λx+ (1− λ)y) ≥ min(f (x), f (y)), ∀x, y ∈ X, ∀λ ∈ (0, 1)with f (x) 6= f (y),
λx+ (1− λ)y ∈ X, f (λx+ (1− λ)y) > 0.
Definition 11. Let S˜ be a fuzzy subset of R. Then S˜ is called a fuzzy quantity if S˜ is compact (that is, for every α ∈ (0, 1], the
α-level sets of S˜ are closed bounded sets), normal ([S˜]1 6= ), and has a semistrictly quasiconcave membership function.
From now onwards, the set of all fuzzy quantities on R is denoted by F0(R). It is important to note that all crisp numbers
as well as all commonly used fuzzy numbers such as triangular fuzzy numbers, trapezoidal fuzzy numbers, bell shaped fuzzy
numbers are in F0(R). An important property of fuzzy quantity is that if B˜ is a fuzzy quantity then,
BL(α) = inf{x | x ∈ [B˜]α} = inf[B˜]α = inf(B˜)α
BR(α) = sup{x | x ∈ [B˜]α} = sup[B˜]α = sup(B˜)α.
Here BL(α) and BR(α) are respectively called the left part and the right part of the fuzzy quantity B˜ at the level α [23].
Lemma 12. Let a˜j ∈ F0(R), xj ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . , n. Then the fuzzy set a˜1x1+· · ·+ a˜nxn defined by the extension principle is again
a fuzzy quantity.
Definition 13 (Zero-sum Gamewith Fuzzy Payoffs).When Player I chooses a pure strategy i ∈ Sm and Player II chooses a pure
strategy j ∈ Sn, let a˜ij be fuzzy payoff for Player I and −˜aij be a fuzzy payoff for Player II. The fuzzy payoff a˜ij is represented
by the L–R fuzzy number:
a˜ij =
(
aij, a′ij, a`ij
)
LR
(2.1)
where aij is amean value, a′ij is a left spread and a`ij is a right spread. The two-person zero-sum fuzzy game can be represented
as a fuzzy payoff matrix:
A˜ =
[ a˜11 . . . a˜1n
. . . . . . . . .
a˜m1 . . . a˜mn
]
. (2.2)
The game defined by (2.2) is called a two-person zero-sum game with fuzzy payoffs. When each of the players chooses
a strategy, a payoff for each one of them is represented as a fuzzy number; but the outcome of the game has a zero-sum
structure. So; when one player receives a gain, the other player suffers an equal loss [1,14].
Definition 14 (Fuzzy Expected Payoff). For any pair of the mixed strategies x ∈ X and y ∈ Y , fuzzy expected payoff of Player
I is defined as the fuzzy number:
x˜Ay =
(
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
aijxiyj,
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
a′ijxiyj,
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
a`ijxiyj
)
LR
(2.3)
characterized by the membership function:
µx˜Ay : D→ [0, 1] (2.4)
where D ∈ R is the domain of payoff for Player I [1,14].
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Definition 15 (Fuzzy Goal). Let the domain of the payoff for Player I be denoted D ∈ R. Then the fuzzy goal G˜ with respect
to the payoff for Player I is defined as the fuzzy set on the set D characterized by the membership function:
µG˜ : D→ [0, 1]. (2.5)
Amembership function value of a fuzzy goal can be interpreted as a degree of attainment of the fuzzy goal. Then we assume
that, for any pair of payoffs, a player prefers the payoff having the greater degree of attainment of the fuzzy goal to the other
payoff [1,14,25].
Definition 16 (A Degree of Attainment of a Fuzzy Goal). For any pair of mixed strategies (x, y), let fuzzy expected payoff for
Player I be denoted by x˜Ay and let fuzzy goal for Player I be denoted by G˜. Then a fuzzy set expressing an attainment state
of the fuzzy goal is represented by the intersection of the fuzzy expected payoff x˜Ay and the fuzzy goal G˜. The membership
function of the fuzzy set is represented as:
µa(x,y)(p) = min(µx˜Ay(p), µG˜(p)) (2.6)
where p ∈ D is a payoff for Player I. A degree of attainment of fuzzy goal is defined as the maximum of the membership
function (2.6), i.e.,
_µa(x,y)(p
∗) = max
p
µa(x,y)(p) = max
p
{
(µx˜Ay(p), µG˜(p))
}
. (2.7)
A degree of attainment of the fuzzy goal can be considered to be a concept similar to a degree of the satisfaction of the
fuzzy decision by Bellman and Zadeh [26] when the fuzzy constraint is replaced by the fuzzy expected payoff, it can also
be interpreted as a possibility of attainment of the fuzzy goal. When Player I and II choose the mixed strategies _x and _y ,
respectively, the degree of attainment of fuzzy goal _µa(x,y)(p∗) is determined by (2.7).We assume that Player I supposes that
Player II choose a strategy _y so as to minimize Player I’s degree of attainment of the aggregated fuzzy goal _µa( _x , _y )(p∗),
i.e., Player I’s degree of attainment of the aggregated fuzzy goal, assuming he choose _x , will be v(x) = miny∈Y _µa( _x , _y )(p∗).
Hence, Player I chooses a strategy so as to maximize his degree of attainment of the aggregated fuzzy goal v(x). In short, we
assume that Player I behaves according to the maximin principle in terms of a degree of attainment of the aggregated fuzzy
goal [1,14,27].
Definition 17 (Maximin Solutionwith Respect to aDegree of Attainment of the Aggregated Fuzzy Goal). For any pair of themixed
strategies (x, y), let a degree of attainment of the aggregated fuzzy goal for Player I be denoted _µa(x,y)(p∗). Then Player I’s
maximin value with respect to a degree of attainment of the aggregated fuzzy goal is:
max
x∈X
min
y∈Y
_µa(x,y)(p
∗) (2.8)
and that strategy x is called the maximin solution with respect to the degree of attainment of the aggregated fuzzy goal. The
maximin solution can be considered to be the solution maximizing the function, which is the minimal value of the function
with respect to the opponent’s decision variables. We assume that a player has no information about his opponent or the
information is not useful for the decisionmaking. We can also consider Player II’s minimax solution with respect to a degree
of attainment of the aggregated fuzzy goal in a similar way [1,14].
3. Computational methods
We show Sakawa’s method for computing the max–min solution of two-person zero-sum games with fuzzy payoffs and
fuzzy goals and Vijay’s method for computing fuzzy matrix games via a fuzzy relation approach.
3.1. Max–min solution
We assume that membership functions of the fuzzy goals and shape functions for fuzzy numbers representing the fuzzy
payoffs are linear. A membership function of Player I’s fuzzy goal is represented as:
µG˜(p) =

0 if p < a
p− a
a− a if a ≤ p ≤ a
1 if a < p
 (3.1)
where a is the payoff giving theworst degree of satisfaction to Player I and a is the payoff giving the best degree of satisfaction
to Player I. That is, Player I is not satisfied with a payoff less than a but is fully satisfied with a payoff greater than a. Let a
shape function for fuzzy numbers be:
L(p) = R(p) = max(0, 1− |p|). (3.2)
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When Players I and II choose pure strategies i ∈ I and j ∈ J , respectively, a payoff for Player I is represented as the fuzzy
number a˜ij =
(
aij, a′ij, a`ij
)
LR
characterized by the membership function:
µa˜ij(p) =

0 if p < aij − a′ij
(p− aij + a′ij)/a′ij if aij − a′ij ≤ p < aij
(aij + a`ij − p)/a`ij if aij ≤ p ≤ aij + a`ij
0 if aij + a`ij < p
 . (3.3)
Then, Player I’s maximin value with respect to a degree of attainment of the aggregated fuzzy goal is represented as:
max
x∈X
min
y∈Y
_µa(x,y)(p
∗) = max
x∈X
min
y∈Y maxp min(µx˜Ay(p), µG˜(p)). (3.4)
Whenmembership functions are linear, the maximin strategy with respect to an attainment degree of the aggregated fuzzy
goal can be obtained by solving the mathematical programming problem in the following theorem [1,14].
Theorem 18. For the two-person zero-sum games, if membership functions of the fuzzy goal and shape functions of L–R fuzzy
numbers for fuzzy payoffs are linear such as (3.1) and (3.3), Player I’s maximin solution with respect to a degree of attainment of
the aggregated fuzzy goal is equal to an optimal solution to the nonlinear programming problem:
max imize
x,σ
σ
subject to
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
(aij + a`ij)xiyj − a
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
a`ijxiyj + a− a
≥ σ , ∀y ∈ Y
m∑
i=1
xi = 1
xi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . ,m
(3.5)
if the optimal value σ ∗ satisfies 0 ≤ σ ∗ ≤ 1 [1,14].
Problem (3.5) is a nonlinear programming problemwhich has decision variables x and σ , and it should be noted that the
first constraint of problem (3.5) must hold for any y ∈ Y . Fortunately, however, since the constraints of maximizing decision
variable x and theminimizing decision variable y in problem (3.5) are separated from each other, we can solve problem (3.5)
by applying amethod using the relaxation procedure by Shimizu and Aiyoshi [28], and thenwe obtain themaximin solution.
Consider the following relaxed problem for problem (3.5) by taking L points yl, l = 1, . . . , L satisfying yl ∈ Y ,
i.e.,
∑n
j=1 y
l
j = 1, ylj ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . , n.
max imize
x,σ
σ
subject to
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
(aij + a`ij)xiylj − a
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
a`ijxiylj + a− a
≥ σ , l = 1, . . . , L
m∑
i=1
xi = 1
xi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . ,m.
(3.6)
Let an optimal solution to the relaxed problem (3.6) be denoted by (xL, σ L). If (xL, σ L) is feasible to the original problem (3.5),
it must be optimal to (3.5). The test for feasibility and the generation of the most violated constraint can be accomplished
by solving the minimization problem:
min imize
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
(aij + a`ij)xLi yj − a
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
a`ijxLi yj + a− a
subject to
n∑
j=1
yj = 1
yj ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . , n.
(3.7)
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Let an optimal solution to the minimization problem (3.7) be denoted by yL+1 , _y (xL). If (xL, _y (xL), σ L) satisfies the
constraints of the original problem (3.5). If it does not satisfy them, add the constraint
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
(aij + a`ij)xiyL+1j − a
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
a`ijxiyL+1j + a− a
≥ σ (3.8)
to the relaxed problem (3.6) and solve it again. The constraint (3.8) violates the constraint of original problem (3.5) to the
greatest extent. The optimal solution to original problem (3.5) can be obtained by repeating this procedure in a finite number
of iterations [28], but it is supposed that solving the relaxed problem (3.6) is still difficult because it has nonlinear constraints.
However, we can reduce the relaxed problem (3.6), which is a linear fractional programming problem, to a linear
programming problem by using Sakawa’s method [29].
The variable σ in the relaxed problem (3.6) satisfies the condition 0 ≤ σ ≤ 1, because the variable σ corresponds to the
maximin value with respect to a degree of attainment of the fuzzy goal. Let σ = _σ , where _σ is a constant value in [0, 1].
Then the constraints of the relaxed problem (3.6) become as follows:
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
(aij + a`ij)xiylj − a ≥ _σ
(
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
a`ijxiylj + a− a
)
, l = 1, . . . , L
m∑
i=1
xi = 1,
xi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . ,m.
(3.9)
We can find the maximal constant value _σ by repeating this procedure in a finite number of iterations. The minimization
problem (3.7), which generates the most violated constraint, can be reduced to a linear programming problem by using the
variable transformation by Charnes and Cooper [30]. Set
1(
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
a`ijxLi yj + a− a
) = t (3.10)
and
yjt = zj. (3.11)
The minimization problem (3.7) can be rewritten as follows:
min imize
z,t
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
(aij + a`ij)xLi zj − at
subject to
n∑
j=1
zj = t
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
a`ijxLi zj + (a− a)t = 1
zj ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . , n.
(3.12)
Problem (3.12) is a linear programming problem which has decision variables z = (z1, . . . , zn) and t , and has the two
equality constraints and the non-negative conditions of the decision variables.
The algorithm for computing the maximin solution to a two-person zero-sum game with fuzzy payoffs and fuzzy goals
can be summarized in the following steps.
Algorithm 1.
Step 1: Identify a fuzzy goal for a payoff. Choose an initial point y1 ∈ Y and set l = 1. Then formulate a relaxed problem
(3.6), which is a linear fractional programming problem.
Step 2: Formulate the constraints (3.9) by setting σ = _σ in the constraints of the relaxed problem (3.6). Compute an
optimal solution (x∗, σ ∗) by making use of the bisection method and phase one of the simplex method. Then set xL = x∗
Step 3: Formulate the minimization linear programming problem (3.12) with xL.
Step 4: Solve problem (3.12) and obtain an optimal solution (z∗, t∗). Let the objective function value be denoted by
φ(z∗, t∗).
Step 5: If φ(z∗, t∗) ≥ σ ∗+ , terminate, where  is a predetermined constant. Then xL is a maximin solution with respect
to a degree of attainment of the fuzzy goal. Otherwise, i.e., if φ(z∗, t∗) < σ ∗ +  , set l = l+ 1, return to Step 2.
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Also, problem (3.5) is equivalent to the following problem [1].
max imize
x,σ
σ
subject to
m∑
i=1
(aij + a`ij)xi − a
m∑
i=1
a`ijxi + a− a
≥ σ , j = 1, . . . , n
m∑
i=1
xi = 1
xi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . ,m.
(3.13)
3.2. Fuzzy relation approach
Definition 19. (x∗, y∗, v∗, w∗) ∈ Sm × Sn × F0(R)× F0(R) is called a solution of a matrix game with fuzzy goals and fuzzy
payoffs (FGR) if
v˜∗P˜T ((x∗)t A˜y), ∀y ∈ Sn
(xt A˜y∗)P˜Sw˜, ∀x ∈ Sm.
Here x∗ is called an optimal strategy for Player I and y∗ is called an optimal strategy for Player II. The solution concept of
FGR motivates us to associate the following pair of fuzzy optimization problems FP-1 and FD-1 with Player I and Player II,
respectively:
(FP-1) Find x ∈ Smsuch that v˜P˜T (xt A˜y), ∀y ∈ Sn
(FD-1) Find y ∈ Snsuch that (xt A˜y)P˜Sw˜, ∀x ∈ Sm.
Invoking Definition 9, the membership functions for the constraints (xt A˜y)P˜T v˜ and w˜P˜Sxt A˜y are respectively given as:
µP˜T (x
t A˜y, v˜) = sup
r,r ′∈R
{T (µP(r, r ′), T (µxt A˜y(r)µv˜(r ′)))},
µP˜S (w˜, x
t A˜y) = inf
r,r ′′∈R
{S(S(1− µxt A˜y(r), 1− µw˜(r ′′)), µP(r ′′, r))}.
Using Bellman and Zadeh approach [26], problem (FP-1) and (FD-1) become the following pair of optimization problems:
max
x∈Sm
min
y∈Sn
(µP˜T (v˜, x
t A˜y))
max
y∈Sn
min
x∈Sm
(µP˜S (x
t A˜y, w˜)).
The two problems can be reframed as:
(CP-1) max λ
subject to λ ≤ µP˜T (v˜, xt A˜y), ∀y ∈ Sn,
x ∈ Sm.
(CD-1) max η
subject to η ≤ µP˜S (xt A˜y, w˜), ∀x ∈ Sm,
y ∈ Sn.
Let X = R, the binary relation be≤, the valued relation be ∼≤ : R× R→ [0, 1] termed as ‘‘essentially less than or equal
to’’ by Zimmermann [31], the t-norm T and t-conorm S be min and max operators, respectively. The fuzzy relations P˜T and
P˜S so obtained are respectively denoted by
∼≤min and ∼≤max.
Consider a game in which the goals of Player I and Player II are crisp real numbers v and w, and the payoff matrix A˜ is a
crisp matrix having entries as real numbers. Consequently, the fuzzy relation P˜ will be the same as the valued relation
∼≤.
Then the matrix game with fuzzy goals and fuzzy payoffs FGR reduces to a matrix game:
FGRCP = (Sm, Sn, A, v, ∼≤min, ∼≤max).
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Here, it is assumed that Player I (Respectively Player II) is optimizing with respect to the ordering
∼≤min(∼≤max). In this case,
the optimization problem (FP-1) and (FD-1) become:
(FP-2) Find x ∈ Sm such that v∼≤minxtAy, ∀y ∈ Sn
(FD-2) Find x ∈ Sn such that xtAy∼≤maxw, ∀x ∈ Sm.
3.2.1. Matrix game with possibility and necessity relations
Let X = R, B˜, D˜ ∈ F(X), and fuzzy relation P be≤. Further, t-norm T and t-conorm S are taken asmin andmax operators,
respectively. This leads to the concepts of possibility and necessity indices introduced originally by Dubois and Prade as
follows [32].
Pos(B˜ ≤ D˜) = sup{min(µB(x), µD(y)) | x ≤ y, x, y ∈ X},
Nec(B˜ < D˜) = inf{max(1− µB(x), 1− µD(y)) | x ≤ y, x, y ∈ X}.
We shall use the following notations in what follows.
B˜≤Pos D˜ if Pos(B˜ ≤ D˜),
B˜<Nec D˜ if Nec(B˜ < D˜).
By B˜≥Pos D˜ or B˜>Nec D˜, we mean, D˜≤Pos B˜ or D˜<Nec B˜, respectively.
Possibility and necessity indices are fuzzy relations on R which can be viewed as the extensions of the binary relations,
≤. Moreover, they are dual fuzzy relations to each other. The fuzzy matrix game with fuzzy payoffs and possibility and
necessity relations is defined as:
FGPNFP = (Sm, Sn, A˜, v˜,≤pos, w˜,<Nec).
The problems (FP-1) and (FP-2) of Player I and Player II, respectively, become:
(FP-3) Find x ∈ Sm such that v˜≤Pos xt A˜y, ∀y ∈ Sn
(FD-3) Find y ∈ Sn such that xt A˜y<Nec w˜, ∀x ∈ Sm.
Here the membership functions for the fuzzy constraints are taken as:
µPos(v˜, xt A˜y) = Pos(v˜≤Pos xt A˜y) = v˜≤Pos xt A˜y,
µNec(xt A˜y, w˜) = Nec(xt A˜y < w˜) = xt A˜y<Nec w˜.
Since Player I (Player II) is a ‘‘maximization’’ (minimization) player, he looks for the best (the least) fuzzy quantity v˜ (w˜)
with respect to the fuzzy constraint of the associated problem (FP-3) (FD-3). For this reason, we need to define the ordering
relation between the fuzzy quantities.
Suppose B˜, D˜ ∈ F0(R), and α ∈ (0, 1]. Then the ordering between them is taken as:
B˜(≤Pos)αD˜ if µPos(B˜ ≤ D˜) ≥ α,
B˜(<Nec)αD˜ if µNec(B˜ < D˜) ≥ α.
By B˜(>Nec)αD˜, we will mean, D˜(<Nec)α B˜.
Proposition 20. Let B˜, D˜ ∈ F0(R), and α ∈ (0, 1]. Then,
(i) B˜(≤Pos)αD˜ if and only if BL(α) ≤ DR(α)
(ii) B˜(<Nec)1−αD˜ if and only if BR(α) ≤ DL(α) [21,33,23].
Definition 21. For α ∈ (0, 1], a pair (v˜, w˜) is called an (α, 1 − α)-reasonable solution of FGPNFP if there exists ( _x , _y ) ∈
Sm × Sn such that
v˜(≤Pos)α( _x )t A˜y, ∀y ∈ Sn
xt A˜ _y (<Nec)1−αw˜, ∀x ∈ Sm.
In this case, v˜ is called an α-reasonable value for Player I and w˜ is called (1− α)-reasonable value for Player II [2].
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Definition 22. Let B˜, D˜ ∈ F0(R). We say,
B˜(≤Pos)∗αD˜ if B˜(≤Pos)αD˜ and µPos(D˜, B˜) < α.
B˜(≤Nec)∗αD˜ if B˜(≤Nec)αD˜ and µNec(D˜, B˜) < α.
Notice that (≤Pos)∗α and (≤Nec)∗α are binary relations on F0(R) being constructed from fuzzy relations (≤Pos)∗α and (≤Nec)∗α ,
respectively. If B˜ and D˜ are crisp real numbers, say B and D, respectively, then B˜(≤Pos)∗αD˜ (or B˜(≤Nec)∗αD˜) if and only if B < D.
Proposition 23. Let B˜, D˜ ∈ F0(R), and α ∈ (0, 1]. Then,
(i) B˜(≤Pos)∗αD˜ if and only if B˜R(α) < D˜L(α).
(ii) B˜(<Nec)∗1−αD˜ if and only if B˜
R(α) ≤ D˜L(α) and B˜L(α) < D˜R(α) [23].
Definition 24. Let [Z1](α) and [Z2](1−α) be, respectively, the sets of all α-reasonable values v˜ for Player I and (1 − α)-
reasonable values w˜ for Player II. v˜∗∗ ∈ [Z1](α) and w˜∗∗ ∈ [Z2](1−α) are calledα-equilibrium solution and (1−α)-equilibrium
solution of FGPNFP, respectively, if there exist no v˜ ∈ [Z1](α) and no w˜ ∈ [Z2](1−α), respectively, such that [2]
v˜∗
∗
(≤Pos)∗α v˜,
w˜(<Nec)∗(1−α)w˜
∗∗ .
Remark 25. (i) The above definition suggests that, there exists no v˜ ∈ [Z1](α) such that (v∗∗)R(α) ≤ vL(α). Here, (v∗∗)R(α)
is the right part of the fuzzy quantity v˜∗∗ , and vL(α) is the left part of the fuzzy quantity v˜ at the level α. Thus, the maximum
value of vL(α), ∀v˜ ∈ [Z1](α), provides a lower bound of (v∗∗)R(α). In other words, the maximum value of vL(α) over [Z1](α)
can be interpreted as theminimum value of the greatest aspiration of Player I at the level α, which in a sense, is an optimistic
approach.
(ii) Similarly, there exists no w˜ ∈ [Z2](1−α) such thatwR(α) ≤ (w∗∗)L(α) andwL(α) < (w∗∗)R(α).Here, (w∗∗)L(α), wL(α)
are respectively the right parts of the fuzzy quantities w˜∗∗ , w˜ at the level α. Thus, the minimum value of wL(α), ∀w˜ ∈
[Z2](1−α), provides a upper boundof (w∗∗)R(α). in otherwords, theminimumvalue ofwL(α) over [Z2](1−α) can be interpreted
as the maximum value of the greatest aspiration of Player II at the level α, which in a sense, is a pessimistic approach [2].
Definition 26. For α ∈ (0, 1], let x∗∗(α) ∈ Sn and y∗∗(α) ∈ Sm be the strategies corresponding to the α-equilibrium
solution v˜∗∗ and (1 − α)-equilibrium solution w˜∗∗ , respectively. The 4-tuple (x∗∗(α), y∗∗(α), v˜∗∗ , w˜∗∗) is called a solution
of the game FGPNFP, v˜∗∗ (respectively w˜∗∗ ) is termed as the α-value (respectively (1 − α)-value) of the game FGPNFP for
Player I (respectively Player II) and x∗∗ (respectively y∗∗ ) is called an optimal strategy for Player I (respectively Player II).
Thus, the problems of Player I and Player II can be formulated as:
(FP-4) ˜max v˜
subject to v˜(≤Pos)αxt A˜y, ∀y ∈ Sn
x ∈ Sm.
(FD-4) ˜max w˜
subject to xt A˜y(<Nec)(1−α)w˜, ∀x ∈ Sm,
y ∈ Sn.
Problem (FP-4) and (FD-4) are proven to be dual to each other by [23], Furthermore, the problems (FP-4) and (FD-4) are
equivalent to the following crisp linear programming problems (CLP-1) and (CLD-1), respectively [23].
(CLP-1) max vL(α)
subject to xtAR(α)y ≤ vL(α), ∀y ∈ Sn
x ∈ Sm.
(CLD-1) max wL(α)
subject to wL(α) ≥ xtAR(α)y, ∀x ∈ Sm
y ∈ Sn.
Here, vL(α), wL(α) and AR(α) denoted the left part of v˜, left part of w˜ and right part of A˜, respectively. Since Sm and
Sn are convex polytopes, and (CLP-1) and (CLD-1) are crisp linear programming problems, it is sufficient to consider only
the extreme points of Sm and Sn. Therefore solving the above two problems is same as solving the following two linear
programs [2].
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(CLP-2) max vL(α)
subject to
m∑
i=1
aRij(α)xi ≥ vL(α), j = 1, . . . , n
etx = 1,
x ≥ 0.
(CLD-2) max wL(α)
subject to
n∑
j=1
aRij(α)yj ≤ wL(α), i = 1, . . . ,m
ety = 1,
y ≥ 0.
Theorem 27. Let α ∈ (0, 1] be fixed. Suppose (x∗(α), v∗(α)) and (y∗(α), w∗(α)) be the optimal solutions to the crisp primal–
dual linear programming problems (CLP-2) and (CLD-2), respectively. Then, x∗(α) (respectively y∗(α)) is an optimal strategy for
Player I (respectively Player II), and v∗(α) (respectivelyw∗(α)) is an α-acceptable value (respectively (1− α)-acceptable value)
for Player I (respectively Player II).
Example 28. Consider a numerical example [2,15,34].
A =
[
(175, 180, 190) (150, 156, 158)
(80, 90, 100) (175, 180, 190)
]
.
The method directly solving the problem (3.13) by the max–min solution, Let fuzzy goal G of Player I for the objective be
represented by the following linear membership function:
µG(p) =

0 if p < 90
p− 90
90
if 90 ≤ p ≤ 180
1 if 180 < p
 .
maxα
subject to
190x1 + 100x2 − 90
10x1 + 10x2 + 90 ≥ α
158x1 + 190x2 − 90
2x1 + 10x2 + 90 ≥ α
x1 + x2 = 1
x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≥ 0.
We computed the max–min solution and obtained the same solution by the fuzzy relation approach [2].
α = 0.8, x1 = 0.7785, x2 = 0.2215.
Example 29. Let
A =
[
(8, 10, 12) (17, 20, 23)
(16, 17, 18) (10, 12, 14)
]
.
The method directly solving the problem (3.13) by the max–min solution, Let fuzzy goal G of Player I for the objective be
represented by the following linear membership function:
µG(p) =

0 if p < 10
p− 10
10
if 10 ≤ p ≤ 20
1 if 20 < p

maxα
subject to
12x1 + 18x2 − 10
2x1 + x2 + 10 ≥ α
23x1 + 14x2 − 10
3x1 + 2x2 + 10 ≥ α
x1 + x2 = 1
x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≥ 0
α = 0.5468625221819, x1 = 0.3031241681, x2 = 0.6968758318.
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The method directly solving the problem (CLP-2) by the fuzzy relation approach,
max vL(α)
subject to (12− 2α)x1 + (18− α)x2 ≥ vL(α)
(23− 3α)x1 + (14− 2α)x2 ≥ vL(α)
x1 + x2 = 1
x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≥ 0
for α = 0.5468625221819,
x1 = 0.3031241682, x2 = 0.6968758318.
The method directly solving the problem (CLD-2) by the fuzzy relation approach,
min wL(α)
subject to (12− 2α)y1 + (23− 3α)y2 ≤ wL(α)
(18− α)x1 + (12− 2α)x2 ≤ wL(α)
y1 + y2 = 1
y1 ≥ 0, y2 ≥ 0
for α = 0.5468625221819,
y1 = 0.6968758318, y2 = 0.3031241682.
We computed the solutions by the max–min solution and the fuzzy relation approach, and obtained the same solutions.
4. Conclusions
In this paper, we have considered themaximin solutionswith respect to a degree of attainment of the fuzzy goal and have
presented the computational method for their solutions. We have used the variable transformation by Charnes and Cooper
and the relaxation procedure for minimax problems by Shimizu and Aiyoshi for the maximin solutions of two-person zero-
sum games with fuzzy payoffs and fuzzy goals.
For two-person zero-sum games, if membership functions of the fuzzy goal and shape functions of L–R fuzzy numbers for
fuzzy payoffs are linear, themaximin solution with respect to a degree of attainment of the aggregated fuzzy goal presented
with Sakawa’s solution concept.
Fuzzy relation approach is adopted to study fuzzymatrix gameswith fuzzy goals and fuzzy payoffs byVijay. The games are
shown to be equivalent to two semi-infinite optimization problems in order to investigate the duality relations between the
semi-infinite problems. As a result, we obtained that the fuzzy relation approach and the max–min solution are equivalent.
Finally, a numerical example [2,15,34] and an original numerical example have illustrated the proposed methods, and
obtained the same solutions.
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